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Comment
Prisons Are Dangerous Places: Criminal
Recklessness as the Eighth Amendment Standard
of Liability in McGill v. Duckworth
Scott Rauser
Officials at the Indiana State Prison removed Herbert McGill from the general prison population after his fellow prisoners
labelled him a "snitch."1 The officials placed McGill in the
prison unit which houses inmates on both disciplinary and protective custody status ("IDU").2 In the IDU facility, disciplinary
and protective custody prisoners commingle, for one hour each
day, to use the recreational and shower facilities.3 On McGills
third day in DU, one disciplinary status inmate threatened McGill as he walked to the shower. 4 The inmate followed McGill
into the shower, gagged him with a washcloth, and raped 5him
while three other inmates stood guard brandishing knives.
McGill sued two prison guards and four prison administra1. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992). Prisoners labelled McGill a snitch after he testified
against an inmate who had assaulted a prison guard. Id. McGill's problems
began even before he testified against the inmate. When he arrived at the
prison, McGill received sexually suggestive comments and notes from other inmates. Id. McGill consequently requested a transfer to another institution. Id.
Officials denied his request but moved him closer to a guard's station. Id.
2. Id. One unit of the prison solely houses prisoners on protective custody
status. Id. When this unit is full, prisoners in need of protective custody are
placed in the IDU unit which principally holds prisoners on disciplinary status.
Id. When the prison officials addressed McGill's request for protective custody,
the protective custody unit was filled to capacity. Id. Thus, officials placed McGill in IDU. Id.
3. Id. IDU prisoners may choose to remain in their cells all day or, alternatively, may arrange for a particular time to leave their cells. Id.
4. Id. Earlier, this inmate, Ausley, and another disciplinary status inmate, Halliburton, approached McGill in his cell and threatened him. Id.
Although McGill asked prison officials to remove him from IDU, he did not inform them of this harassment. Id.
5. Id.
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tors under 42 U.S.C. § 19836 for failing to protect him from sexual assault in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 7 After a trial, the jury found that three defendants had violated McGill's Eighth Amendment s right to be
free from assault, because they were "deliberately indifferent" to
his safety. 9 The jury awarded damages against one prison
guard, 10 the assistant superintendent, and the superintendent. 1" The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and held that the deliberate indifference standard requires McGill to demonstrate that the defendants possessed actual knowl2
edge of a specific threat of assault.'
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in McGill v. Duckworth raises
the issue of whether Eighth Amendment liability of prison staff
for failing to protect prisoners from assault should be based
upon an objective "should have known" standard, modeled after
tort recklessness, or upon a subjective "actual knowledge" standard, grounded in criminal recklessness. Resolution of this issue will determine to what extent the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments" 13 pro6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
7. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992). McGill also brought a pendent claim of negligence
under Indiana law. Id.
8. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.

9. McGill v. Duckworth, 726 F. Supp. 1144, 1156 (N.D. Ind. 1989), af'd in
part, rev'd in part, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265
(1992). The jury returned a verdict in favor of McGill and awarded damages in
the amount of $10,000. McGill, 944 F.2d at 347.
10. The district court denied prison guard Brian Webb's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and sustained the jury verdict against Webb
on the grounds that a jury could have reasonably found that Webb acted with
deliberate indifference in patrolling the IDU before and after the attack. McGill, 726 F. Supp. at 1156.
11. The district court similarly denied motions by the prison superintendent and assistant superintendent for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the grounds that they knew "young white boys" in IDU were at physical risk.
from disciplinary segregation inmates, yet they continued the policy of commingling the two classes within the IDU. Id.
12. McGill, 944 F.2d at 349. In addition, the Seventh Circuit overturned
the negligence verdict because McGill knew that Ausley and Halliburton were
following him to the shower and, yet, he failed to avoid the problem by returning to his cell and closing the door. Id. at 352-53. For a detailed discussion
of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 107-118 and accompanying
text.
13. In terms of constitutional protection, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides another basis of relief for prisoners; insofar as
prison officials cannot intentionally deny prisoners their right to personal se-
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14
tects prisoners from sexual and physical assaults.
This Comment argues that precedent does not support McGill's actual knowledge standard and that the Seventh Circuit
developed an unrealistic and unfair framework for evaluating
the defendant's state of mind. Part I outlines the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the Eighth Amendment's
mental component and analyzes the various federal circuit
courts' formulations of the deliberate indifference standard.
Part II details the holding and reasoning of McGill. Part III critiques McGill and articulates why an objective state of mind inquiry, grounded in tort recklessness, constitutes a fairer and
more practical way to determine whether an official acted with
deliberate indifference.

I. KNOWLEDGE OF PRISON ASSAULT RISKS
A.

THE M.NrAL CompoNENr OF THE EiGHm AMENDMENT
In the 1960s, federal courts first applied the Eighth Amend-

curity without procedural due process. Cf Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986) (stating that due process is not implicated by mere negligence of state
official). The Eighth Amendment, however, "serves as the primary source of
substantive protection to convicted prisoners," Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
327 (1986), whereas the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects
pre-trial detainees from punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-40
(1979). Accordingly, most convicted prisoners challenge the conduct of prison
officials and their staff under the Eighth Amendment. In addition to constitutional bases of relief, inmates in state prisons may seek relief in state courts
under general tort theories of recovery. See Russell W. Gray, Note, Wilson v.
Seiter: Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth
Amendment Prison ConditionLaw, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 1339, 1342 n.15 (1992).

14.

McGill is far from alone in being subjected to assault while incarcer-

ated. Prisoners physically and sexually assault other prisoners with alarming
frequency. See generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,421 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (discussing abuse of prisoners by other prisoners and by correctional officers); CARL WEISS & DAvm J. FRLAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS (1974)
(reviewing prevalence of homosexual rape in prison); James E. Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: ConstitutionalProtectionfrom Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE
L. REv. 101, 104-05 (1985) (discussing rates of homicide, assault, and rape in
prison); David M. Siegal, Note, Rape in Prison and Aids: A Challenge for the
Eighth Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STA. L. REv. 1541,
1544-45 (1992) (addressing frequency of homosexual rape among male
prisoners).
Indisputably, inmate violence presents a serious societal problem. Many
commentators assert that victimized prisoners are likely to assault other people
when released. See Robert W. Dumond, The Sexual Assault of Male Inmates in
IncarceratedSettings, 20 INrVrL. J. Soc. LAw 135, 144-48 (1992); Steve Lerner,
Rule of the Cruel, THE NEW REPUBLIc, Oct. 15, 1984, at 17. Further, sexual
assaults in prison pose public health problems, particularly the risk of spreading the AIDS virus. See Siegal, supra, at 1547-51.
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ment to protect prisoners from cruel and unusual prison conditions. Prior to that time, the "hands-off" doctrine, a judicial
policy of non-intervention in the administration of prison affairs, 15 -limited a court's role to ensuring "proportionality," in
other words, that the sentence fits the crime.' 6 Once courts began applying the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment to prison
conditions, 17 the state of mind of responsible prison staff became
a critical component in determining whether prison officials vioright to be free from cruel and unusual
lated a prisoner's
i8
punishment'
15. Robertson, supra note 14, at 103. The hands-off doctrine operated as a
jurisdictional bar to prisoners' claims. Ronald L. Goldfarb & Linda Singer, Redressing Prisoner'sGrievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175, 181 (1970). Three
distinct rationales supported the hands-off doctrine: that judicial oversight is
inconsistent with separation of powers; that courts lack expertise in penology;
and that judicial oversight would subvert prison discipline. Id. at 181. Principles of federalism provided an additional rationale for restraining federal courts
from reviewing the complaints of state prisoners. See Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 515 (1963) (discussing "quasi-separation of powers
argument").
16. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (overturning sentence
which revoked defendant's American citizenship for deserting the army during
wartime); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (overturning sentence
imprisoning defendant for 15 years, in chains, at hard labor for falsifying a public document).
17. In 1974, the Court dramatically renounced the hands-off doctrine stating: "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons
of this country." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Accordingly,
the Court applied the principles of Eighth Amendment law developed during
the hands-off era to prison condition cases. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102-03 (1976).
Most significantly, the Supreme Court established the flexible and dynamic
nature of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in cases challenging the
severity or proportionality of sentences. For instance, the Court stated that the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment evolves with the "standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; see, e.g.,
Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (The Eighth Amendment "may therefore be progressive, and is not fastened to the absolute but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."); see also Michael C. Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Medical Care:
Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. Rxv. 921, 926
(1992) (stating that Eighth Amendment analysis is "not static").
18. The Supreme Court recently held that prisoners must show a culpable
state of mind in all prison condition cases, in addition to showing that the conditions deprive prisoners of a "single identifiable human need." Wilson v. Seiter,
111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991). Before Wilson, the Court applied a state of mind
requirement only in cases involving the treatment of one or a few prisoners, and
not in cases involving prison conditions which affected the prison population as
a whole. Id. at 2323-25. The Wilson court abolished this distinction. Id. at
2326. See infra note 35.
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In Estelle v. Gamble, 19 the Supreme Court held that "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 20 In Estelle, inmate J.W.
Gamble claimed that the prison doctor failed to properly diagnose and treat his back injury. 2 1 The Court concluded that
Gamble's claim alleged, at most, medical malpractice. 2 2 The
Court accordingly dismissed the complaint reasoning that one
incident of medical malpractice,2 3or simple negligence, does not
rise to the level of wantonness.
In Whitley v. Albers,24 the Court held that a prison employee's use of force during a prison riot violates the Eighth
Amendment only if the employee acts "maliciously and sadisti19.

429 U.S. 97 (1976).

20. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). In the
seminal case of Estelle, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Eighth
Amendment to prison conditions. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2484
(1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court recognized that a prisoner has a

constitutional right to adequate medical care because prisoners must rely on
prison authorities for treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. The Court reasoned
that, in severe cases, denial of adequate medical care produces "physical 'torture or lingering death,'" and that such denial produces pain and suffering
without any penological purpose. Id. at 103 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436, 447 (1890)). In addition to the logical obligation of authorities to assume
responsibility for the medical care of prisoners, the Court stated that unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with "contemporary standards of decency" reflected in state legislation affirming the public's obligation to provide medical
care to prisoners who, due to their incarceration, are stripped of their own ability to arrange for medical services. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
21. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Gamble injured his back when a bale of cotton
fell on him while he unloaded a truck at the prison. Id. at 99. Prison authorities provided some medical care, however, for Gamble's back condition, high
blood pressure, and heart problem. Id. at 107.
22. Id. According to the Court, the decision whether to X-ray or provide
additional diagnostic techniques "is a classic example of a matter of medical
judgment." Id.
23. Id. at 105-06. The Court cited Louisiana e= rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947), to support its conclusion that negligent acts by prison officials do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
In Resweber, the Court concluded that subjecting a prisoner to a second electrocution attempt does not violate the Due Process Clause because the first attempt had been the result of an "innocent misadventure." 329 U.S. at 470.
Noting that Gamble could pursue his claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act,
the Court concluded that negligence simply does not have constitutional stature. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-07. Hence, to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of medical care, a prisoner "must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs." Id. at 106.
24. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
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cally for the very purpose of causing harm." 25 In Whitley, inmate Gerald Albers claimed that prison officials inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment by shooting him during their efforts to
quell a prison riot.26 The Court absolved the official from liability, because the guard shot Albers as part of a good faith effort to
restore control over the prison. 27 The Court created a more
stringent state of mind standard for claims arising from emergency situations, reasoning that during serious prison disturbances officials face competing institutional obligations 28 and
must necessarily make decisions "in haste, under pressure,
and
29
frequently without the luxury of a second chance."
Recently, in Wilson v. Seiter,30 the Court reversed a Sixth
Circuit decision that had applied the malicious and sadistic
standard to an Eighth Amendment claim. The plaintiff had alleged that the conditions of an Ohio prison, including overcrowd31
ing, excessive noise, and inadequate heating and cooling,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 32 Distinguishing
Whitley, the Court held
that the deliberate indifference standard
33
governed the claim.
The Wilson Court reasoned that, in terms of constraints facing the prison official, offensive nonmedical conditions are mate34
rially similar to claims alleging inadequate medical treatment.
25. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub noma. Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
26. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314-17. On January 27, 1980, prison guards attempted to move some intoxicated prisoners. Id. at 314. Other prisoners be-

came agitated when they thought the guards used unnecessary force. Id.
Several inmates confronted two guards and took one guard hostage. Id. Inmates began to break furniture and assault another prisoner. Id. at 315. Cap-

tain Whitley assembled an assault squad and, in his attempt to rescue the
captured prison guard, members of the squad shot two inmates. Id. at 316.

27. Id. at 325.
28. Specifically, during a prison riot, officials must balance "the very real
threats the unrest presents to inmates and prison officials alike" with "the possible harms to inmates against whom force might be used." Id. at 320.
29. Id. The Court distinguished Estelle, reasoning that "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury... can typically be established
or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates." Id.
30. 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991).
31. Id. at 2323. The plaintiff, incarcerated at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, also alleged insufficient locker storage space, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate rest rooms, unsanitary dining

facilities and food preparation, and inadequate segregation of mentally and
physically ill inmates. Id.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 2322-23.
Id. at 2326-27.
Id. The Court stated that "the medical care a prisoner receives is just
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In addition to restricting the scope of the malicious and sadistic
standard, the Court imposed a state of mind requirement in all
Eighth Amendment claims involving prison conditions, even if
the offending condition is long-term or systemic.3 5 Under the
Wilson framework, to prove an Eighth Amendment violation a
prisoner must show that at least one prison staff member possessed a culpable state of mind, usually deliberate indifference,
36
in depriving the prisoner of an identifiable human need.

B.

CULPABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PROTECT PRISONERS FROM

ASSAULT

1.

Developing Standards and Defining Risks of Violence

Well before the Supreme Court decided Wilson, every federal circuit court, except the Fourth Circuit,37 applied the delibas much a 'condition' of his confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is
issued, the temperature he is subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is
afforded against other inmates." Id. The Court also reasoned that the responsibility of prison officials to ensure humane living conditions does not clash with
competing institutional responsibilities. Id. at 2326.
35. Id. at 2325. The Court justified imposing a state of mind requirement
in all prison condition cases on the ground that the word "punishment" in the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause implies a deliberate act to chastise or
deter. Id. (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986)).
The United States, as amicus curiae, suggested that a state of mind requirement in cases challenging the general conditions of confinement would allow "officials to interpose the defense that, despite good faith efforts to obtain
funding, fiscal constraints beyond their control prevent the elimination of inhumane conditions." Id. at 2326. Since the parties did not address the "cost defense," the court did not resolve this issue. The Court noted, however, that
there is no "indication that other officials have sought to use such a defense to
avoid the holding of Estelle v. Gamble." Id.
The four dissenting justices believed that a state of mind requirement is
not necessary when the claim challenges conditions affecting the prison population generally. Id. at 2330. Rather, the dissenters argued that a violation of
the Eighth Amendment turns solely on the objective severity of the conditions.
Id.
36. Id. at 2327.
37. See Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 97 (1991) (holding that Eighth Amendment liability attaches only if
the defendant acted wantonly and obdurately). The Moore court's unrefined
wantonness standard seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson. The Wilson decision explicitly states that the meaning of wantonness
varies according to the context in which the claim arises. Wilson, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2326 (1991). For example, maliciousness embodies wantonness when
prison authorities apply force to quell a prison disturbance. Id. (stating that
"Whitley makes clear... that... wantonness does not have a fixed meaning
but must be determined with 'due regard for differences in the kind of conduct
against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged' ").
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erate indifference standard to inmate-on-inmate assault cases.38
Also, several circuits had explicitly rejected arguments that the
malicious and sadistic standard applies in non-riot assault situations. 3 9 Nevertheless, circuits interpreted the meaning and elements of deliberate indifference in various manners. 40 The
circuits vary because deliberate indifference is vague, 4 1 even oxymoronic, 42 and the Supreme Court clarified its meaning only by
advising that it lies somewhere on the wide continuum between
intent and negligence. 43 To clarify the current state of the law,
38. See, e.g., Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 1991); Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990); Cortes-Quinones v.
Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823
(1988); Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1987); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985); Martin
v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984); Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d
637, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1378 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc), overruled by International Woodworkers v. Champion Intl
Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986).
39. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 978 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir.
1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2996 (1993); Berry, 900 F.2d at 149495; Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1991); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In these cases, the
courts of appeal reasoned that the concerns justifying the higher malicious and
sadistic standard are not salient in non-riot assault situations. See, e.g., Berry,
900 F.2d at 1495.
Further, the Berry court held that, in a case where prisoners fatally attacked another prisoner, deliberate indifference embodies a sufficiently high
level of culpability to" 'capture' the importance of... competing obligations" of
prison officials and does not lead to an inappropriate hindsight critique of
"'decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without
the luxury of a second chance.'" Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
327 (1986)); see also Alberti, 978 F.2d at 895 (confining Wilson's malice standard to situations of an emergency or an immediate nature); Hendricks, 942
F.2d at 113 (reasoning that the duty to protect prisoners from violence ordinarily involves no competing penological policies); Morgan, 824 F.2d at 1057-58
(stating that inmate assaults precipitated by overcrowding do not raise legitimate concerns that courts will critique, in hindsight, decisions made in haste).
40. See infra notes 48-90 and accompanying text.
41. See Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1066 (noting that the standard is not easily
defined); Berry, 900 F.2d at 1495 (observing that the term is not self-defining
and courts struggle to give the term a practical meaning); see also Gray, supra
note 13, at 1367.
42. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 816 (1986) (observing that the term "evades rather than expresses
meaning").
43. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (declaring, in reference to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), that a person need not show that the defendants expressly intended to inflict unnecessary pain but must show more than
inadvertent conduct to state an Eighth Amendment claim). The Supreme Court
has not yet decided an Eighth Amendment inmate-on-inmate assault claim and
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the remainder of this section contrasts the various approaches
used to evaluate the defendant's state of mind and conduct in
inmate-on-inmate assault cases. 44
Undoubtedly, the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee
prisoners an assault-free environment. 4 5 Some courts reason
therefore has not directly addressed the meaning of deliberate indifference in
this context. In Davidson v. Cannon, however, the Court decided an inmate
assault claim based on the Due Process Clause. 474 U.S. 344 (1986). The Court
rejected a prisoner's claim that officials abridged his Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights by inadequately protecting him from assault. Id. at 347-48.
The Court held that the prison officials, at most, negligently failed to protect
the plaintiff from assault, and the officials' negligence did not constitute "abuse
of governmental power" that the Due Process Clause protects against. Id. Yet,
the Court did not define whether alternative degrees of intent, such as recklessness, violate the Due Process Clause. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986).
44. The defendant's mental state and conduct comprise the two principal
elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. Since prisoners bring their Eighth
Amendment claims via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, prisoner-plaintiffs encounter
additional burdens and limitations. For instance, § 1983 requires proof of a
causal connection between the defendant's acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.
1986) (per curiam). Proving the liability of supervisors and other officials thus
requires prisoners to show the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged
deficient conduct. See Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985). A
supervisor's liability cannot be predicated on the principles of respondeat superior. See Bailey v. Wood, 909 F.2d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1990).
Moreover, various types of immunity constitute the most significant limitation on Eighth Amendment suits under § 1983. Significantly, state governments and employees in their official capacities enjoy sovereign immunity, see
Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989), and officials sued
in their personal capacities possess qualified immunity from constitutional
suits. For a more detailed discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and relevant procedural issues, see generally Twenty-FirstAnnual Review of CriminalProcedure:
Prisoners'Rights: ProceduralMeans of Enforcement under Section 1983, 80
GEo. L.J 1710 (1992).
45. See, e.g., Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Feigley v. Fulcomer, 720 F. Supp. 475, 478 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Fisher v.
Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1559 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
The Eighth Amendment duty of prison officials and guards, indeed all state
actors, to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, is
likewise well-established. Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1069 (6th Cir. 1991);
Zatler, 802 F.2d at 400 (citing Gullate v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.
1981)). The basis of the prison official's constitutional duty rests on logic similar to that employed by the Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
See supra note 20. Incarceration deprives prisoners of the means of self-protection just as it deprives prisoners of the means to arrange for medical care. See
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
addition, without relief from prison officials, victims of inmate assault would
remain uncompensated because the prisoner who attacked them is most likely
indigent. Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1069.
Several states have voluntarily assumed the duty to protect prisoners by
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that absolute liability of prison authorities for injuries sustained
by prisoners at the hands of other prisoners would produce unjustified results; prison violence is inevitable given the violent
propensities of some inmates. 4 6 Only when prison violence becomes a problem of substantial dimensions does it trigger the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. 4 7
Specifically, prisoners must demonstrate that they have
been subjected to a pervasive, 48 obvious, 4 9 or unreasonable risk
of assault or injury. 50 Defining the scope of the risk, the particular inmate(s) at risk, and the source of the risk largely depends
on how plaintiffs plead and prove their cases. 5 1 Plaintiffs can
allege, for instance, that all prisoners face an unreasonably high
risk of assault from other prisoners, 5 2 that they belong to an
identifiable group of prisoners at risk of sexual or physical asenacting statutes charging prison officials with the responsibility of protecting
inmates. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.315(1)(c) (West 1985) (directing employees of the Department of Corrections to protect "the offender from victimization within the institution").
46. See Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1070; Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 980 (4th
Cir. 1985).
47. See Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In
Woodhous, the Fourth Circuit held that "confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign is actionable." Id. at 890. Later, the Fourth Circuit explained that "a reign of violence and terror," or conditions "approaching
anarchy," are not the minimum standard of liability. Withers v. Levine, 615
F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980). The Withers court
explained that the duty to protect prisoners arises if assaults occur with sufficient frequency to place an identifiable group of prisoners in "reasonable fear
for their safety and to reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the
problem and the need for protective measures." Id. Therefore, prisoners who
fear assault can state an Eighth Amendment claim for relief. Woodhous, 487
F.2d at 890; see also Siegal, supra note 14, at 1559 n.136 (citing cases).
48. See, e.g., Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545, 555 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 187 (1992); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985);
Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984); Woodhous, 487 F.2d at 890.
49. Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
50. See Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 826 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam);
Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990).
51. Occasionally, courts define the risk more narrowly than the plaintiffs
theory. See, e.g., Porm v. White, 762 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985). In Port, the
plaintiff alleged that white inmates who worked in the cafeteria faced a risk of
attack from black inmates. Id. at 637. Although the plaintiff defined the risk
broadly, the court absolved a supervisor because the plaintiff failed to show that
he faced a peculiar risk to himself. Id.; see also Siegal, supra note 14, at 1572
(arguing that courts have shown the ability to "define the risk narrowly when
they are inclined to deny relief, and, conversely, define [the risk) broadly when
they are inclined to extend relief.").
52. See, e.g., Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1985); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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sault,53 or in the narrowest context, that a specific prisoner jeopardizes his or her individual safety. 54 Demonstrating a
pervasive risk of assault requires a rigorous factual showing of
either prior episodes of violence 55 or an exceedingly high
number of assaults in a particular prison facility.56 Showing a
pervasive risk of harm serves two functions. First, it demonstrates that the problem of prison assaults deprives inmates of
their right to personal security and thus satisfies the deprivation component of the Wilson framework.5 7 Further, it allows a
the
jury to readily infer that prison authorities had notice of 58
problem due to the frequency with which assaults occurred.
53. The most common "identifiable group of vulnerable inmates" appears
to be young, white, male prisoners of slight physical stature. See Withers v.
Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); see also,
Robertson, supra note 14, at 115. Courts have recognized other types of"identifiable groups of vulnerable inmates." See Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 797
(7th Cir. 1988) (inmates targeted by gangs); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 475
n.6 (8th Cir. 1984) (new entrants to a prison facility); Gullate v. Potts, 654 F.2d
1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) ("snitches"); Blizzard v. Quillen, 579 F. Supp. 1446,
1450 (D. De. 1984) (same).
54. See, e.g., Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992); Bailey v.
Wood, 909 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (8th Cir. 1990); Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896,
897 (7th Cir. 1990); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 207 (2d Cir. 1985).
55. See Withers, 615 F.2d at 161 (stating that "a pervasive risk of harm
may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents" of violence); see, e.g., Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 827 (1st Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (holding prisoner's allegation that he faced gaybashing insufficient
to establish pervasive risk of harm); Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637,
655 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that 20 assaults during a one year period did
not establish a pervasive risk of harm within an institution incarcerating 344
prisoners). But see Goka v. Bobbit, 862 F.2d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that 13 attacks with broomsticks within a two year period created an issue of
material fact regarding the existence of a pervasive risk of attack); Vosburg v.
Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 766-67 (8th Cir.), cert.denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988) (finding
that evidence demonstrating that prisoners raped plaintiff four times and that
prisoners routinely raped other young inmates established a pervasive risk of
assault).
Prisoners usually demonstrate the pervasiveness of assaults by introducing
evidence on the high number of assaults reported to authorities and the requests for protective custody. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 116-17. Relying
on reported assaults is problematic because in most prison facilities the number
of assaults vastly exceeds the number of reported assaults. Id.
56. See Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) (absolving officials from liability because assaults occurred less frequently in their facility
than in other facilities); Murphy, 653 F.2d at 645 (same).
57. See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 362 (3d Cir. 1992); Siegal, supra
note 13, at 1558.
58. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). In Wilson, the Court
stated that the "long duration of a cruel prison condition may make it easier to
establish knowledge and hence some form of intent." Id. at 2325.
In Withers v. Levine, the standard of liability directly incorporates a notice
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For a significant period of time, however, the liability of
prison authorities under the Eighth Amendment did not turn on
their awareness of the assault risk facing the plaintiff. Instead,
several circuits applied the elements formulated in the Restate(Second) of Torts59 as the constitutional standard of liabilment
ity.60 Under the Restatement, prisoners only need to show the
existence of a pervasive risk of harm and that the authorities
preventing prisoners from
failed to exercise reasonable care in
61
intentionally harming one another.
The Restatement's negligence standard, the prevailing standard in inmate-on-inmate assault cases before the Supreme
Court decided Estelle v. Gamble, became indefensible in light of
Estelle's holding that medical malpractice does not violate the
Eighth Amendment. 62 Indeed, deliberate indifference eventucirally replaced a negligence standard, 63 and presently, 6most
4
cuits equate deliberate indifference with recklessness.

requirement: violence and sexual assaults must occur with sufficient frequency
to "reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the problem and the
need for protective measures." 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 849 (1980); see also Falls v. Nesbitt, 966 F.2d 375, 378 (8th Cir. 1992);
Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Redmond v.
Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 320 (1965).
60. The Fourth Circuit initially adopted the Restatement's formula in
Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Several
other circuits followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Woodhous. See Purvis v.
Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d
143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984);
Walsh v. Brewer, 733 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1984).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TouTs § 320 (1965). Because "failure to exercise reasonable care" states a negligence standard, according to which inadvertent surveillance of prisoners constitutes actionable conduct, prisoners were
not burdened with showing that the defendants knew or had reason to know of
a risk of assault.
62. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1985) (modifying
Withers v. Levine, insofar as that decision seemed to define a negligence standard, in light of the holding of Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)).
64. See, e.g., Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1068-70 (6th Cir. 1991); Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990); Cortes-Quinones v.
Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823
(1988); Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1988); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401-02 (11th Cir. 1986); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457,
460 (9th Cir. 1986); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
Gray, supra note 13, at 1372.
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2. The Circuit Split: Tort Recklessness v. Criminal
Recklessness
Equating deliberate indifference with recklessness does not
resolve the dilemma of formulating elements of liability, because
recklessness is no less ambiguous a concept than deliberate indifference. 65 Generally, recklessness entails examining the defendant's cognizance of a risk as well as the defendant's conduct
in relation to that risk.66 Federal courts evaluate the state of
mind and conduct of prison officials in Eighth Amendment inmate-on-inmate assault cases differently, because circuits have
variously applied tort recklessness and criminal recklessness. 6 7
The difference between tort and criminal recklessness underlies
a significant split of opinion between the circuits.
Tort recklessness, the more prevalent of the two standards
in inmate assault claims, 68 entails an objective inquiry into the
defendant's state of mind. A defendant acts recklessly in tort
when a reasonable person would have had reason to know that
his or her conduct created an unreasonable and substantial risk
of physical harm.6 9 This objective inquiry permits prisoners to
introduce evidence that the officials "should have known" that a
prisoner or group of prisoners faced an unreasonable risk of
70
assault.
In contrast, to satisfy the subjective state of mind requirement of criminal recklessness, the plaintiff must demonstrate
65. See Gray, supra note 13, at 1372-73 (commenting that recklessness is
an amorphous concept because it is comprised of varying levels and degrees).
66. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTN W. ScoT'r, CRnMNAL LAw, § 3.7, at 239 (2d
ed. 1986).
67. Only the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have applied a recklessness standard derived from the criminal law in inmate-upon-inmate assault cases. See
Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1061; Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1987).
68. See supra note 67.
69. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
70. See, e.g., Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 559-60
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988) (holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that Puerto Rican prison officials should
have known that commingling psychologically disturbed prisoners with the
general population jeopardized the safety of the disturbed prisoner); Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding summary judgment
improper when prisoner introduced evidence alleging defendants knew or
should have known that plaintiffs assailant raped other inmates); Morgan v.
District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that government employees should have known that plaintiffs assailant posed a serious danger to
other inmates given his criminal history, prior prison fights, prior threats of
assault, and psychiatric problems).
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that the defendant actually recognized the risk of danger. 7 1 The
Seventh Circuit first applied a criminal recklessness standard to
evaluate the Eighth Amendment liability of prison officials in
Duckworth v. Franzen.7 2 Reasoning that a gross negligence
standard eclipses the "deliberate" component of deliberate indifference, 73 the Franzen court adopted criminal recklessness as
the minimum standard of liability. 74 Yet, the court's definition
of recklessness did not resolve whether a plaintiff must show
that the defendant actually knew of the risk or whether the jury
75
may infer such knowledge.
Only one other circuit, the Sixth Circuit, has applied criminal recklessness in an inmate-on-inmate assault case. 76 In
Marsh v. Am, the Sixth Circuit resolved the ambiguity in Franzen against the plaintiff by requiring a showing that the defendant actually knew that the plaintiff would be injured and that
the defendant consciously refused to protect the plaintiff from
77
assault.
71. See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: DeliberateIndifference as
a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CrIuM. L. & CRINOLOGY 191, 220-21 (Summer
1990).
72. 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). In Franzen, one prisoner died and several prisoners suffered serious injuries when the
bus in which they were riding caught fire. Id. at 648. The prisoners were unable to exit the bus because authorities had chained them together and all but
the front exits of the bus were sealed for security reasons. Id. The prisoners
sued three Illinois prison officials and three guards, charging that they failed to
take adequate precautions against the consequences of a bus fire. Id.
73. Id. at 653.
74. Id. at 652-53. The Franzen court stated that second degree murder
provides a classic example of criminal recklessness, such as where a "defendant
chokes his victim, intending to injure him seriously but not to kill him, but
death results." Id. at 652. Committing an act that is "socially costless to avoid"
and "highiy dangerous" also exemplifies criminal recklessness. Id.
75. The Franzen court stated that "recklessness in criminal law implies an
act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of the risk can be inferred."
Id. Later in its opinion, however, the court states that "[plunishment implies at
a minimum actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, so that a
conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendanfs failure to prevent it." Id. at 653. Thus, the court failed to clarify whether
a finder of fact may infer knowledge, and if knowledge of a substantial risk is
inferred, whether a finder of fact must also infer a "conscious, culpable refusal
to prevent the harm."
76. See Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. In Marsh, an inmate with a violent criminal history and record of
fighting in prison beat her cellmate with a padlock causing her serious injury.
Id. at 1059. The court of appeals absolved all defendants of liability. Id. The
court overturned jury verdicts against two defendants on the grounds that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants knew that the assailant posed a
specific risk of harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 1061, 1063-64.

1993]

PRISON ASSAULTS

179

In addition to providing a more lenient state of mind inquiry, the tort recklessness standard provides greater likelihood
that courts will adjudge a prison official's actions or omissions
unconstitutional. Usually, a prison official's failure to act in the
face of a pervasive risk satisfies tort recklessness. 78 A few circuits applying an objective knowledge standard require the
plaintiff to demonstrate, however, a more egregious omission in
79
the defendant's failure to protect prisoners from violence.
Nevertheless, prisoners face an even more arduous task in proving criminal recklessness. To prove criminal recklessness, prisoners must demonstrate that in light of the defendant's actual
knowledge of an assault risk, the defendant "consciously refused
The Marsh court expressed a strong reluctance to award damages against
prison employees in their personal capacity. Id. at 1070. According to the
court, absent a high standard of liability, states and municipalities will have
difficulty recruiting qualified prison staff. Id. Judge Kennedy, concurring separately, stressed that judges must extend deference to a prison administrator's
security decisions. Id. at 1072.
78. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 766-67 (8th Cir.) (upholding
liability of warden for failing to develop adequate administrative policies to protect plaintiff and similarly situated prisoners from risk of sexual assault in high
risk prison areas), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988); Cortes-Quinones v.
Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 559-60 (1st Cir.) (finding that prison officials' failure to segregate psychiatrically disturbed prisoners from the general
population constituted sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1984)
(concluding that warden's failure to report felony assaults to prosecutors, to develop a policy for the detection of ineffective cell locks, and to station guards
where they could provide protection supported a prisoner's verdict).
79. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir.
1990); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 1986).
In Berry, the court held that in addition to showing a failure to take reasonable measures to avert the risk of attack, prisoners must prove that the failure,
in light of the defendants' knowledge of the risk, justifies liability for the consequences of their unintended conduct. 900 F.2d at 1498.
In Morgan, the court upheld a trial courts jury instruction compelling the
plaintiff to prove that the defendants were "outrageously insensitive or flagrantly indifferent to the situation and took no significant action to correct or
avoid the risk of harm." 824 F.2d at 1058. In applying this standard, the Morgan court held that the prisoner presented sufficient evidence showing that the
government employees flagrantly deviated from a reasonable standard of care,
specifically by failing to place the assailant in a higher security unit and failing
to devise adequate classification procedures. Id. at 1059-60.
In Berg, the Ninth Circuit outlined three factors for evaluating whether
prison authorities acted with deliberate indifference. 794 F.2d at 462. Juries
should consider whether the defendants were guided by concerns for the safety
of other inmates, whether the defendants took preventative measures to protect
the prisoner, and whether less dangerous alternatives existed. Id. These factors compel a heavy measure of deference to the actions of prison officials. Id.
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to take steps to protect the prisoner from injury."8 0
The Third and Tenth Circuits reject criminal recklessness
as the standard of liability in inmate-on-inmate assault cases. 8 '
In Berry v. City of Muskogee,8 2 the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
criminal recklessness collapses the distinction between the malicious and sadistic standard and the deliberate indifference standard.8 3 The Berry court accordingly adopted a tort recklessness
85
standard.84 Similarly, the Third Circuit, in Young v. Quinlan,
rejected an actual knowledge requirement in Eighth Amendment inmate-on-inmate assault cases. Citing a Ninth Circuit
decision that applied an objective knowledge test in a case where
a sexually assaulted pre-trial detainee alleged that jail officials
deprived him of due process, 8 6 the Third Circuit reasoned that
the standards of liability under the Eighth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be
congruent.8 7 Unlike the Berry court, however, the Young court
distinguished the Eighth Amendment objective test from its underpinnings in tort law.88 Under this stricter variant of the
"should have known" test, prisoners must prove that a "lay person would easily recognize" the risk of assault and the need for
preventative action.8 9
Apart from the emerging inter-circuit split, the Seventh Cir80. See Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1061; see also Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218,
221 n.6 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.20(2)(c) which states that
"a person acts recklessly... when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk").
81. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360 (3d Cir. 1992); Berry v. City of
Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495-96 (10th Cir. 1990).
82. 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 1495.
84. Id. at 1496.
85. 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992).
86. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991)
(en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 972 (1992). The Redman court stated that the
deliberate indifference standard is met "if... officials know or should know of
the particular vulnerability [to suicide of an inmate], then the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on them an obligation not to act with reckless indifference
to that vulnerability." Id. (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d
663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)).
87. 960 F.2d at 360.
88. Id. at 361 (stating "[wie stress, however, that in constitutional context
'should have known' is a phrase of art with a meaning distinct from its usual
meaning in the context of the law of torts.").
89. Id. (citing Monmouth County Correctional Instl Inmates v. Lanzaro,
834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988)). This standard essentially discounts the training and experience prison staff possess in
recognizing danger by adopting a "lay custodian" baseline for measuring the
defendant's state of mind.
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cult sits internally divided between those judges who favor application of a tort recklessness standard and those who favor a
criminal recklessness standard in Eighth Amendment cases
challenging safety conditions in prison. 90 McGill v. Duckworth
attempts to resolve the intra-circuit division by categorically rejecting the objective state of mind approaches in all inmate-oninmate assault cases.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUITS DECISION IN McGILL
Soon after his incarceration at the Indiana State Prison, fellow prisoners labelled Herbert McGill a "snitch," because he testified against another inmate who had assaulted a guard. 9 1
McGill requested placement in the protective custody unit after
he sustained a minor assault as a consequence of his testimony. 92 Because the protective custody unit was full, prison officials placed McGill in IDU, a unit which principally confines
inmates on disciplinary segregation status. 93 Prisoners in IDU
remain locked in their cells 23 hours a day; for one hour a day,
however, the prisoners commingle to use recreational and
94
shower facilities.
Two disciplinary status inmates in IDU threatened and
harassed McGill shortly after his arrival in IDU.9 5 Later, McGill requested placement in the unit that solely houses prisoners
on protective custody status, but he did not inform officials
about the harassment. 96 Prison officials denied McGilrs re90. Several Seventh Circuit cases apply an objective "should have known"
test, more closely aligned with tort recklessness. Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896
(7th Cir. 1990); Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1988); Watts v.
Laurent, 774 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986); Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1985). Other Seventh Circuit cases apply a
subjective actual knowledge test, closely aligned with criminal recklessness.
Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1990); Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646
(7th Cir. 1988); Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1061 (1988); Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987).
91. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
92. Id. McGill is slightly built, weighing between 116 and 122 pounds and
his height is five feet, seven inches. Appellee/Cross Appellant's Brief at 36, McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991) (No. 85-C-70), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1265 (1992).
93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Generally, inmates on disciplinary status have violated one or more prison regulations, including fighting
and serious felonies. JoHN W. PALmER, CoNsTITUIoNAL RiGHTS OF PmSONERs
59 (3d
94.
95.
96.
112 S.

ed. 1985).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
Ct. 1265 (1992).
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newed request for placement in a safer cellblock, because they
could accommodate his request only by returning another pro97
tective custody inmate to the general population or into IDU.
Thereafter, a larger, disciplinary status prisoner, who had earlier harassed McGill, followed McGill to the shower. 98 The
larger inmate gagged and raped him while three other inmates
stood guard wielding knives. 99
Following a trial in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the jury found that the prison superintendent, assistant superintendent, and one guard violated
McGill's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.' 0 0
In their post-trial motions, the defendants challenged the jury
instruction that allowed the jury to find deliberate indifference
based on the defendant's objective knowledge of the risk.101 The
97.
98.

Id.
Id.

99. The Seventh Circuit summarized the circumstances of McGill's rape as
follows. McGill left his cell for the shower when Ansley approached him and
made sexually suggestive comments. Id. McGill continued walking and Ausley
and Halliburton threatened him. Id. While walking, McGill spoke to two
guards about some lost property but did not ask for help. Id. As McGill
shampooed his hair, Ausley gagged and sodomized him while three other inmates guarded the area and brandished improvised knives. Id.
100. Id. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of McGill on a state negligence claim. Id. The jury absolved one guard on all claims, and the trial judge
granted a directed verdict in favor of two prison administrators. Id.
101. McGill v. Duckworth, 726 F. Supp. 1144, 1148-49 (N.D. Ind. 1989), affd
in part,rev'd in part, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265

(1992). On the issue of defendant's knowledge, the district court provided the
jury with an extensive set of instructions. Id. The first instruction stated that
prison officials are liable for failing to protect a prisoner only if they act with
deliberate indifference. Id. at 1148. The instruction explained that to prove
deliberate indifference, McGill must show that the defendants "intentionally or
recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of danger that was known to him or
would have been readily apparent to a reasonable person his [sic] position." Id.
at 1148-49.
The next instruction explained that a defendant acts with deliberate indifference when he knows of the danger or when the threat of violence is so pervasive that knowledge can be inferred and he fails to enforce a policy or take
reasonable steps to protect a prisoner. Id. at 1149. The court also instructed
the jury that the plaintiff must prove that the defendants "knew, or should
have known, that the plaintiff had been threatened with violence or sexual assault and that it was highly foreseeable that the plaintiff would be physically or
sexually assaulted by another inmate .... " Id. In order to prove his claim,
McGill also had to show reckless disregard for or intentional deprivation of his
right to be free from assault, and that the conduct proximately caused his injury. Id.
The defendants objected most strenuously to the final instruction. This instruction stated that if the defendants had information which would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate the situation, the jury could equate the
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defendants also challenged the sufficiency of evidence to hold
10 2
each defendant deliberately indifferent to McGill's rights.
The district court rejected the challenge to the jury instructions,
because Seventh Circuit precedent supported a standard based
on tort recklessness 10 3 and reasoned that a subjective standard
might encourage prison officials to avoid learning of impending
violence. 10 4 The court also found that the evidence supported
the jury's findings that the prison administrators should have
known of the risk facing smaller, protective custody prisoners in
IDU,10 5 and that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference through
their policy of commingling the two classes of
06
inmates.
information the defendants would have learned through such an investigation
with actual knowledge. Id. The court instructed the jury that it could infer
knowledge from circumstantial evidence. Id. For instance, the instruction
stated that knowledge can be inferred when a dangerous condition exists for a
substantial period of time and the defendants had regular opportunities to observe the condition. Id.
102. Id. at 1152. The defendants argued five points to support their claim
that McGill failed to show "deliberate indifference." They noted that they took
action each time McGill requested a move and that McGill did not show that his
move to IDU placed him in any particular danger from his assailant. Id. Moreover, McGill did not inform anyone that he feared his assailant. Id. Further,
neither McGill nor Ausley were members of identifiable groups that would put
defendants on notice of heightened risk. Id. Finally, the defendants argued
that McGill failed to prove that administrators placed him in an institution
where violence and terror reign. Id.
103. Id. at 1151. The defendants relied on Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d
645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986), a case involving protection
from fire hazards rather than inmate assaults, to support their argument that
an objective standard is inappropriate for Eighth Amendment purposes. 726 F.
Supp. at 1149-51. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (detailing the
Franzen decision and reasoning). The court held that a post-Franzen inmate
assault case, Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1988), applied tort
recklessness. 726 F. Supp. at 1151.
104. 726 F. Supp. at 1151.
105. See id. at 1153-56. The district court surveyed previous inmate assault
cases within the circuit and concluded that the threat posed to smaller, protective custody inmates like McGill by inmates on disciplinary segregation was
less identifiable than the risks in other cases. Id. at 1153-55. The court held,
however, that the previous cases do not "state a constitutional baseline or factual minimum" to establish deliberate indifference. Id. at 1155.
The district court held that the jury could have found that other inmates
harassed McGill and that a higher rate of violence and sexual assault exists in
IDU than in the prison as a whole. Id. The evidence at trial showed that McGill was of slight stature and that weaker inmates were vulnerable to attack in
IDU. Id. These facts, the court reasoned, were sufficient to impute to all defendants knowledge that smaller protective custody inmates were at physical
risk from disciplinary segregation inmates in IDU. Id. at 1156.
106. Id. The court noted that the superintendents issued no policy directive
for separating the two classes of inmates and thereby placed McGill in danger.
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The Seventh Circuit reversed, repudiating a state of mind
07
inquiry based on objective standards and tort recklessness.'
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court prefers criminal
recklessness because the Supreme Court had cited Duckworth v.
0 8 "with approval" in two Eighth Amendment cases.' 0 9
Franzen1
In rejecting tort recklessness, the court further reasoned that
such a standard approaches absolute liability when applied to
prison guards and wardens."10 Specifically, the court found that
a tort recklessness standard unfairly holds prison employees
personally liable for damages even though the responsibility for
conditions which aggravate prison violence, such as overcrowding and inmates' temperament,"' rests
in part with the legisla1 12
ture through its control of funding.
Id. Although the prison guard exercised no control over policy, the court sustained the verdict against him because the jury could have reasonably found
that he was deliberately indifferent; McGill testified that the guard shouted
"[puiss on you" just prior to the time of the rape, which supports the inference
that the guard precluded McGill from informing him of the threat. Id.
107. 944 F.2d at 349. The McGill court stated that in order to implicate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, officials must intend to punish a prisoner. Id. at 347. The court noted, however,
that courts treat both deliberate indifference and recklessness as the functional
equivalent of intent. Id. In other words, an official's "total unconcern for a prisoner's welfare-coupled with serious risks. ..
" violates the Eighth Amendment.
Id. The court reasoned that the precise definition of recklessness must separate
"punishment" from the "unwelcome injuries that occur when so many violent
persons are locked up together." Id.
108. 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
109. McGill, 944 F.2d at 348-49 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321
(1991) and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)). The McGill court read Wilson to resolve the "conflict between the objective and subjective understandings
of recklessness in favor of Franzen'ssubjective standard." Id. at 349. Further,
the McGill court stated that "Wilson's understanding of intent tracks our own
in Archie which explicitly adopted the subjective (criminal law) sense of recklessness." Id. (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir.
1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)). The court concluded that
criminal recklessness represents the law in the Seventh Circuit and that cases
applying tort recklessness do not survive Wilson. McGill, 944 F.2d at 349.
110. Id. at 348-49. The court based its conclusion on the assumption that
"[slome level of brutality and sexual aggression" is inevitable in prison given
that many prisoners are confined because they are dangerous. Id. at 348.
Given the inevitability of violence, "it will always be possible to say that the
guards 'should have known' of the risk. Indeed they should, and do." Id. According to the court, the "should have known" approach leads to absolute liability contrary to Supreme Court precedent derived from Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976). Id.
111. In McGill, the constraint chiefly consisted of a shortage of space in the
celiblock which solely houses inmates on protective custody status. 944 F.2d at
350.
112. Id. at 348-49. "The 'should have known' approach allows plaintiffs to
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The court held that McGill could prevail only by showing
that each defendant had actual knowledge of the threat posed to
him by the specific assailants, that the assault was readily preventable, and that instead of intervening to protect McGill, the
defendants allowed the assailants to proceed.'1 3 McGill could
prove actual knowledge, the court explained, by demonstrating
either that he informed prison officials about the specific
threat 1 4 or that the prison officials deliberately avoided learning about the threat. 115 By requiring McGill to prove actual
knowledge of a specific threat, the court defined the risk much
more narrowly than McGill's theory of liability would have defined the risk.116
tax employees of the prison system with the effects of circumstances beyond
their control." Id. at 349. With respect to prison guards, the court referred to
their inability to control the temperament of inmates, design of the prison,
placement of the prisoners, and ratio of staff to inmates. Id. at 348. With respect to prison administrators, the court reasoned that the epidemic of overcrowded prisons effectively eliminates their ability to confine each inmate only
with those of similar status. Id. at 349. Moreover, a prisoner like McGill,
"small, young, labelled as a snitch," will face high risks regardless of where
prison officials place him. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The court stated that other circuits have found that the failure to
inform prison officials about threats destroys prisoner assault claims at the
pleading stage. Id. (citing Bell v. Stigers, 937 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying the same principle to suicide)); Blankenship v. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741
(10th Cir. 1988); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1987)).
115. Id. at 351. Although McGill did not argue that the defendants deliberately avoided knowledge, the court suggested that the "ostrich" instruction of
criminal law is an appropriate alternative standard of liability because, as a
"species of intent," it honors both the "deliberate" and "indifference" aspects of
the intent requirement imposed by Estelle and related cases. Id. The court further stated that since behaving like an ostrich suffices for criminal liability, it
suffices for liability under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
116. Id. at 350. On appeal, McGill attempted to show that he belonged to
three identifiable groups of prisoners who face a higher risk of assault. Id; Appelee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 27-37, McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992). McGill argued that the defendants knew he faced a constant threat of violence because of his small stature
and physical weakness relative to other inmates. McGill noted that he had informed officials of earlier threats he had received while housed in the general
population. Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 27-28. McGill also argued that
the defendants knew that protective custody inmates in IDU faced risks from
disciplinary segregation inmates because disciplinary inmates often comprise
the most violent prisoners. Id. at 27-29. Further, McGill argued that in spite of
this general knowledge, the administrators failed to enact or enforce a policy
providing special surveillance for smaller inmates, on protective custody status,
commingled with inmates who have violated prison rules. Id. at 36. Last, McGill argued that officials knew that "snitches" face increased risk of attack. Id.
at 28.
The McGill court explicitly rejected theories of liability predicated on the
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In absolving the prison officials from Eighth Amendment liability, the court did not find insufficient evidence of actual
knowledge, but instead concluded that the record did not show
or even imply that officials placed McGill in IDU "because of,
rather than in spite of, the risk to him."1 1 7 In effect, the officials'
good faith efforts to help McGill, albeit constrained due to limits
on space and money, insulated them from Eighth Amendment
liability. i1 8
III. THE UNFAIRNESS AND IMPRACTICALITY OF
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE
A.

LACK OF SUPPORTING PRECEDENT

In McGill v. Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit erroneously
concluded that the Supreme Court equates deliberate indifference with criminal recklessness from the fact that the Court
cited Duckworth v. Franzen "with approval" in Whitley v. Albers
and Wilson v. Seiter.i i 9 Neither Whitley nor Wilson supports the
actual knowledge holding derived from criminal recklessness.
In Whitley, the Court did not define "deliberate indifference,"
because it rejected that standard in cases involving the use of
notion that the plaintiff faced a general risk of harm as a "species of the 'should
have known' approach." McGill, 944 F.2d at 350.
117. Id. (emphasis in original omitted). The court noted that McGill failed
to introduce evidence showing an alternative strategy the wardens could have
followed, within their budget, to reduce the risk of violence. Id. Moreover, the
court observed that McGill did not contest the defendants' submission that they
would have liked to separate all of the protective custody inmates from all disciplinary inmates but were unable to do so because the legislature failed to provide sufficient funding or prison space. Id. The court also indicated that if
officials had placed McGill in a unit housing only protective custody inmates at
the expense of another similarly situated inmate, the risk of harm would have
simply shifted to the evicted protective custody inmate, and thus the risk to
vulnerable inmates as a group would remain the same. Id.
118. Id. The court implied that McGill could have prevailed only by squaring the warden's decision of placing him in IDU with the Supreme Court's holding in the equal protection case, Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979). Id. at 348. The court reasoned that the administrator's decision to
remove McGill from the general population because he complained of threats
after being labelled a snitch disproves the notions that they wanted him humiliated or that they "didn't give a fig for his welfare .... " Id. at 350.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the verdict against the prison guard because
McGill failed to show that the guard knew of McGil's impending rape. Id. at
350-51. The court noted that McGill did not inform the guard that he feared an
attack when McGill passed him while walking to the shower. Id. at 351. The
court stated rhetorically: "Is [the guard] to be held liable on the ground that he
was supposed to know McGill's danger better than McGill himself?" Id.
119. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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force during prison riots. 120 Moreover, Whitley cited Franzen as
a case which aids the trier of fact in determining whether officials used force maliciously and sadistically. 12 1 Thus, Franzen's
definition of criminal recklessness, as cited in Whitley, informs
lower courts of the meaning of maliciousness, not deliberate
indifference.
In addition, McGill ignores Whitley's discussion of an objective standard in evaluating maliciousness. Maliciousness, the
Whitley Court stated, can usually be determined by examining
factors such as the need for force and the extent of the prisoner's
injury, and then inferring whether the use of force evinced
"wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as
12 2 Mcis tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur."
Gill's subjective standard in effect elevates "deliberate indifference" above Whitley's malicious and sadistic standard, even
though the Supreme Court fashioned maliciousness as a higher
standard of culpability.
The McGill court similarly misconstrued the Court's citation to Franzen in Wilson. The Wilson Court cited Franzen to
support the proposition that the Eighth Amendment's mental
component applies in every prison conditions case, not to define
deliberate indifference. 123 In fact, the Wilson Court cited two
inmate-on-inmate assault cases that evaluated the defendant's
state of mind by using an objective "should have known" standard.' 2 4 Hence, the citation to these two cases indicates that
Wilson supports an objective standard in inmate assault cases
even though the Supreme Court has not expressly defined the
deliberate indifference standard.
In McGill, the Seventh Circuit purported to interpret and
apply Estelle's deliberate indifference standard, but the court's
reasoning more closely resembles Whitley's test of whether force
was applied with malice or good faith. 12 5 For example, the Sev120. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) ("In [the setting of a prison
riot], a deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and
frequently without the luxury of a second chance.").
121. Id. at 321.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
124. The Court cited Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556,
558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988), and Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2327 (1991).
125. See supra notes 43, 110, 111, & 112 and accompanying text. McGill's
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enth Circuit concluded that the prison officials showed concern
12 6
for McGill's safety by granting him protective custody.
Although good faith efforts would preclude a finding of malice,
the Supreme Court has never accepted the proposition
that good
12 7
faith efforts negate deliberate indifference.
The application of criminal recklessness to inmate-oninmate assault claims undermines the Supreme Court's effort to
distinguish malice from deliberate indifference.' 28 These
Eighth Amendment claims do not warrant a high standard of
liability because the responsibility to protect prisoners from assault does not clash with "equally important governmental responsibilities." 12 9 Rather, the goal of maintaining prison
security chiefly entails prevention of inmate-on-inmate assaults.

B.

STATE OF MIND STANDARDS AND

FARNEss

1. The Unrealistic Burden of Demonstrating Actual
Knowledge
In light of the realities of prison life, proving actual knowledge in court is as difficult as it is impractical. In essence, McGill v. Duckworth transfers the duty of monitoring prison safety
from prison officials to the very prisoners who are at risk. Moreover, McGill shifts that duty without considering the obstacles
prisoners face in fulfilling this notification duty.
repeated citation to PersonnelAdm'r of Mass. v. Feeney represents another departure from the deliberate indifference standard. McGill, 944 F.2d at 348.
Although the McGill court held that something less than an express intent to
harm is necessary to impose liability, the citation to Feeney's "because of, rather
than in spite of" formulation reveals that the court applied an intent standard
in lieu of a recklessness standard.
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 35 (discussing Wilson's failure to recognize the good
faith cost defense). Good faith efforts should not preclude a finding of deliberate indifference. The fact that officials took some action does not automatically
render their other acts or omissions constitutionally adequate. Moore v.
Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1321 (4th Cir. 1991) (Murnaghan J., dissenting)
("To excuse what has not been done, although required, because of other things
that have been done, is wrong."). For example, although administrators put
McGill on "protective custody" status, McGill's safety was not enhanced by his
placement in a unit containing inmates on disciplinary status. The administrators were not deliberately indifferent because they withheld protective custody
status, but because they operated a dangerous and inadequate system of protective custody.
128. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
129. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) (finding deliberate indifference an appropriate standard in claims of inadequate medical care because the duty to provide medical care does not clash with "equally important
governmental responsibilities").
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McGill requires a prisoner to specifically identify which
prisoner will attack him.1 3 0 Because prisoners commonly enlist
other prisoners to execute assaults,1 3 1 a threatened prisoner
does not always know which prisoner will execute the assault,
132
thus rendering a specific notice requirement impractical.
Although wardens and guards confront similar difficulties in
identifying specific assailants, they can and should take safety
measures to protect prisoners threatened by certain groups of
prisoners or by the prison population as a whole.
Of even greater practical concern, McGill adopts an absolute rule compelling "snitching" even though such conduct increased plaintiffs risk of assault initially.1 3 3 Snitching,
informing and cooperating with authorities, is forbidden by the
"inmate code." 13 4 Undeniably, prison informants suffer significant risks of reprisal and retribution for snitching. 13 5 Prisoners
who inform authorities about particular threats from another
prisoner risk retaliation not only from that prisoner but also
from the general inmate population. 13 6 Burdening a prisoner to
specifically notify authorities constitutes a delusive guarantee of
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. See Stachelek v. Fairman, 1989 WL 18227, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see
also Robertson, supra note 14, at 104 ("Life in many prisons is cheap: a 'bit,' or
murder, can be purchased for a few cartons of cigarettes.").
132. The specific notice requirement is also unreasonable because threats of
assault do not invariably precede the assault itself. Absent a threat, McGill
holds a prisoner's claim per se insufficient. No prison official can be charged
with knowledge of a specific threat in this circumstance, and the strict application of a specific notice rule precludes liability even when prison officials place
an obviously vulnerable inmate in a position where he is subject to assault from
various prisoners.
133. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
134. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1078 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
Life behind [prison] walls is to a large extent governed by the "inmate
code," one tenet of which strictly prohibits prisoners from "snitching"
on fellow inmates. The consequences of becoming a snitch may include
physical retaliation, including threats of death, the fear of which helps
to persuade even well intending inmates to abide by the code.
Id.
135. See Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
("[Miany inmates referred to the phrase 'snitches get stitches' as a slogan frequently used by assaultive inmates to threaten inmates who complain to the
authorities."); Martino v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (D. Or. 1983) ("If
inmates complain to officials, they are labelled 'snitches' and will 'pay' later,
when assistance is not available."); see also Robertson, supra note 14, at 108
("Snitching invites the most severe retribution."); Mary Wilcox, Note, The Sexually Assaulted Prisoner: His Rights Under the Eighth Amendment, 12 NEW
ENG. J. ON CraM. & Cirv. CoNFINEMENT, 349, 353 (1986) ("'Ratting' on another
prisoner is a sure way to subject oneself to further physical abuse.").
136. Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Eighth Amendment protection and inappropriately shifts the
analysis from the defendant's state of mind to the plaintiffs conduct. 137 McGill blatantly overlooks the fact that prisoners often
cannot notify officials about specific threats.
In addition, the actual knowledge requirement imposes unfair evidentiary burdens on prisoners. In particular, prisoners
will experience great difficulty in meeting their burden when defendants testify that they neither realized the risk facing the
prisoner nor were apprised of the prisoner's notification. 138 In
trials where the question of actual knowledge hinges on weighing the credibility of the testimony, judges and juries
will more
13 9
likely believe the state employee than a prisoner.
Due to this evidentiary burden, prisoners need the full
gamut of circumstantial evidence in order to prove a defendant's
recklessness. According to McGill, however, prisoners can only
use circumstantial evidence to show either that the inmate notified officials or that the officials deliberately avoided learning
unwelcome knowledge. 140 This restriction is unfair because
plaintiffs generally prove recklessness, even in the criminal
sense, by drawing general inferences from the totality of circumstances. 14 1 McGill burdens prisoners with an actual knowledge
standard, while substantially limiting their ability to meet that
standard.
2. The Illusory Policy Objections to Tort Recklessness
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits raised four principal policy
objections to applying a "should have known" standard in inmate assault cases. In McGill, the Seventh Circuit presented
two policy objections: objective standards, applied to prison officials and prison guards, create absolute liability and unfair137. The Seventh Circuit has held that contributory negligence is not a defense to reckless conduct. Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).
138. See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 66, at 238.
139. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH. L. R-v. 5, 49
(1980). "[T]he plaintiff (particularly if he is a convicted criminal claiming
prison or police abuse) may face a jury that finds his credibility suspect, his
appearance distasteful, and his claim weak." Id.
140. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
141. See LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 66, at 238 (A defendant's "subjective
realization of risk.., must generally be inferred from his words and conduct in
the light of the circumstances."); see also WaILLs PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 213-14 (5th ed. 1984) ("Since [conscious indifference]
is almost never admitted, and can be proved only by the conduct and the circumstances, an objective standard must of necessity in practice be applied.").
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ness. 142 The Sixth Circuit has concluded that a lower standard
of liability also impinges on a state's ability to retain qualified
prison staff and fails to accord due deference to the security decisions of prison officials.143

These objections provide insufficient bases for adopting the
extremely demanding standard of criminal recklessness. The
McGill court distorts the nature of the objective standard by
equating "should have known" with absolute liability.'4 Prisoners cannot prevail on their Eighth Amendment claims, no
matter how lenient the standard, simply by showing that they
sustained an injurious attack from another prisoner. Tort recklessness obligates prisoners to demonstrate an unreasonable
risk of assault and, at a minimum, an unreasonable failure by
officials or guards to respond to that risk.145 Jurors need not
and will not always find that a defendant "should have known"
the plaintiff faced a threat of assault. The objective standard,
however, at least allows a jury to determine at which point the
ignorance of assault risks constitutes reckless
defendant's
146
behavior.
The McGill court most strenuously objects to applying tort
recklessness when prison staff face personal liability for "circumstances beyond their control." 147 According to the McGill
court, prison employees should not bear the costs, in the form of
compensatory damages, of violence precipitated by overcrowded
and underfunded prison facilities. 148 The McGill decision fails,
however, to distinguish the issue of constitutional violations
from the issue of appropriate relief. Moreover, McGill's concept
of "responsibility" implicitly sanctions the "cost defense" as an
effective way to negate a finding of deliberate indifference. The
Supreme 49Court, however, has never sanctioned a "cost
defense."1
Furthermore, prison employees should be held personally liable when overcrowding and other systemic deficiencies produce
142.

See supra notes 110 & 112.

143.
144.

See supra note 77.
See supra note 110.

145. See supra notes 70 & 78 and accompanying text.
146. The outcome of McGill demonstrates that the actual knowledge requirement effectively subordinates the jury's role as factfinder. Under a criminal recklessness standard, defendants will very often prevail at pre-trial stages
of litigation as well as on appeal when courts consider the sufficiency of
evidence.
147.

See supra note 112.

148.

See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.

149.

See supra note 35.
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conditions conducive to violent behavior. Normally, state lawyers represent corrections personnel when prisoners sue them in
their personal capacities. 15 0 Moreover, states generally indemnify individual defendants from liability for damages.' 5 ' Hence,
tort recklessness does not unfairly burden prison employees.
Rather, indemnity forces the state's treasury to bear the cost of
constitutional violations and provides states with a financial incentive to reduce overcrowding and remedy other systemic deficiencies. 15 2 Safer prisons ultimately serve the state's interests
in prisoner rehabilitation and in lessening the risk of full scale
53
riots.'
Nor can the McGill court justify its higher liability threshold by arguing that it promotes other, equally important state
interests. Because prison employees generally do not personally
pay damages,' 5 4 personal liability does not impede state efforts
to recruit and retain qualified personnel. In fact, conscientious
prison administrators may even welcome liability as a means of
pressuring the state legislature to provide adequate funding for
security measures.
The principle that courts should defer to the considered
choices of prison officials does not apply in the context of protecting prisoners from assault and that principle certainly does not
justify imposing an extremely high standard of liability. Concededly, deference may promote the exercise of administrative
discretion to ameliorate security problems. Courts cannot, however, practicably defer to the defendants' state of mind or knowledge because, unlike policy choices, monitoring safety risks and
investigating potential threats do not entail considered choices
between alternatives.' 5 5 The state of mind issue in Eighth
Amendment inmate-on-inmate assault claims does not center
See Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.7-1 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West 1993); TEX REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. § 104.002 (West 1993);
see also Phillip E. Hassman, Validity and Construction of Statute Authorizing
or Requiring Governmental Unit to Indemnify Public Officer or Employee for
LiabilityArising Out of Performance of Public Duties, 71 A.L.R.3D 90 (1976).
152. See Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 562 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988). Even McGill recognizes the utility of
tort recklessness in encouraging the state to consider the costs of inmate violence when deciding "how many prisons to build and whether to increase the
sentence for crimes." 944 F.2d at 349.
153. See Gray, supra note 13, at 1343.
154. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
155. Moreover, Estelle v. Gamble already confers sufficient deference by
holding that negligent conduct does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
150.
151.
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upon policy choices but upon whether the defendant has taken
constitutionally adequate steps to become apprised of and respond to risks of physical and sexual assault.
3.

The Soundness of Tort Recklessness

Criminal recklessness simply does not "hold the balance
true"156 between the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners and
state interests. In contrast to the unfairness and impracticality
of criminal recklessness, tort recklessness preserves the jurisprudence developed to protect an identifiably vulnerable prisoner from physical and sexual assault. Similarly, tort
recklessness encourages vigilance on the part of prison officials
and guards in recognizing and responding to assault risks. Further, the tort standard maintains congruence with Fourteenth
Amendment due process standards and the qualified immunity
doctrine. Moreover, it promotes the evolution of the Eighth
Amendment by allowing jurors to evaluate claims based in part
upon the "standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma57
turing society."'1
As applied in McGill, criminal recklessness contradicts
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that was designed to protect
vulnerable prisoners. Younger, smaller prisoners generally encounter the constant threat of sexual assault by other inmates; 158 for them, prisons are indeed "dangerous places." 159 A
pervasive risk of sexual assault, demonstrated by past incidents
of rape, gives prison officials notice of a security problem and the
need for remedial measures. A prisoner's Eighth Amendment
right to be free from a pervasive risk of sexual assault should
not vest only when officials know which specific prisoner will
attack.
Tort recklessness realistically estimates prison officials' and
guards' ability to reduce incidents of violence between prisoners.' 60 Officials may enact policies which improve inmate classi156.

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983) (stating that" '(flidelity'

to the commands of the Constitution suggests balanced judgment rather than
exhortation").
157. See supra note 17.
158. See supra note 53.
159. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992).
160. See Dumond, supra note 14, at 148. In cases where a prisoner cannot

prove actual knowledge, McGill preempts inquiry into whether the defendant
had the power to prevent the plaintiffs injury. This high threshold of liability
insulates prison officials from liability even where the assault is attributable to
their own discrete acts or omissions. Cf Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettle-
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fication and separate inmates into compatible categories. 16 1
Wardens can ensure that employees report incidents of violence
for prosecution. 16 2 As the "primary 'agents of influence'" on
prison behavior, 163 prison guards also can reduce the number of
assaults committed by prisoners under their charge. Holding
prison guards liable when they "should have known" of the risk
to maintain the highest possible level of
encourages guards
16 4
surveillance.
The objective state of mind inquiry of tort recklessness
maintains appropriate consistency between the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the doctrine of qualified immunity. Under the Eighth
Amendment, convicted prisoners should receive the same degree
of protection from assault and bear no greater burden in constitutional litigation than pre-trial detainees. 16 5 Also, congruence
between the Eighth Amendment standard of liability and the obship, 842 F.2d 556 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988). In Cortes-Quinones, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to
find that the Director of Puerto Rico's Penal Institutions, the Corrections Administrator, and the Superintendent and Chairman of the Treatment and Classification Committee acted with deliberate indifference toward a psychiatrically
disturbed prisoner who was killed by his cellmates. Id. at 558-61. The court
held that although the conditions in Puerto Rico's prisons were appallingly bad
and severely overcrowded, each defendant could have taken steps to protect the
deceased prisoner. Id. For example, the officials could have segregated the psychiatric prisoner from the general prison population. Id. at 560-61. The court
found that the defendants were deliberately indifferent based on their own actions, not based on factors beyond their control. Id.
161. Dumond, supra note 14, at 149.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 148 (citing Peter L. Nacci & Thomas R. Kane, The Incidence of
Sex and Sexual Aggression in Federal Prisons, 47 FED. PROBATION 31, 32
(1983)).
164. Prison guards are well-positioned to know both the character of their
facility and the prisoners confined to their care. They not only learn through
experience which prisoners are dangerous, but they also have the freedom to
investigate and discover potential conflicts between prisoners.
165. Proponents of a high threshold for Eighth Amendment liability note
that pre-trial detainees, whose rights are guaranteed under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot be punished at all, see Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-40 (1979), whereas convicted prisoners cannot be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. In the Eighth Amendment context,
however, the state of mind inquiry does not address whether the deprivation
constituted cruelty and arbitrariness, but whether the defendants intended to
punish the plaintiff, See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) ("An
intent requirement is either implicit in the word 'punishment' or [it) is not.").
Hence, the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of "punishment," as embodied
in a state of mind standard, should not vary with the Eighth Amendment's
state of mind standard and definition of punishment.
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simplicity in
jective qualified immunity defense allows greater
1 66
the complex practice of section 1983 claims.
The Supreme Court has established that the meaning of
cruel and unusual punishment evolves and "acquires meaning
67
as public opinion becomes enlightened with humane justice."'
Unlike criminal recklessness, an objective standard allows jurors to determine what level of surveillance and protection
in order to conform to "Ameriguards and officials must provide
168
can conceptions of decency."
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has indirectly compelled the lower
courts to apply the "deliberate indifference" standard when
evaluating a prison official's state of mind in Eighth Amendment prison assault cases. Most federal circuit courts equate
"deliberate indifference" with tort recklessness and allow prisoners to demonstrate that the officials "should have known" of
the general risk of assault. The Seventh Circuit's decision in
McGill v. Duckworth, however, imposes a subjective actual
knowledge standard based on criminal recklessness. This standard effectively limits constitutional protection to rare cases in
which a prisoner notifies officials about a specific threat of
harm.
Supreme Court precedent does not support application of a
subjective state of mind standard in Eighth Amendment inmate
assault claims. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's concern that an
objective standard unfairly holds prison employees personally liable for circumstances beyond their control underestimates the
power of wardens and guards to reduce inmate assaults and ignores the fact that states generally indemnify such individuals
against damage awards. Ultimately, in terms of rehabilitative
goals and prison security, McGill's high threshold of liability
works against state interests. Most important, unlike the law
applied in McGill, an objective "should have known" standard
preserves prisoners' constitutional rights to personal security
and protection from pervasive risks of sexual and physical
assault.
166. Given that most prisoners must proceed pro se, at least initially and
past the motion to dismiss stage, a strong case exists for greater simplicity in
§ 1983 Eighth Amendment claims.
167.

See supra note 17.

168. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975 n.1 (1989) (emphasis in
original omitted).

